Emerson's Drift "Extremes meet," Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in his journal after a snowstorm buried Concord m December 1834. "Misfortunes even may be so accumulated as to be ludicrous. To be shipwrecked is bad: to be shipwrecked on an iceberg is horrible; to be shipwrecked on an iceberg in a snowstorm confounds us; to be shipwrecked on an iceberg m a storm and to find a bear on the snow bank to dispute the sailor's landing which is not driven away till he has bitten off a sailor's arm, is rueful to laughter."' The extremes that meet through compounding coincidence in this passage -"misfortunes" (the beginning) and "laughter" (the end)are among many that occupy Emerson in his writing.
T. Scott McMillin
The Frolic Architecture of Snow Building on Emerson's Drift Emerson's Drift "Extremes meet," Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in his journal after a snowstorm buried Concord m December 1834. "Misfortunes even may be so accumulated as to be ludicrous. To be shipwrecked is bad: to be shipwrecked on an iceberg is horrible; to be shipwrecked on an iceberg in a snowstorm confounds us; to be shipwrecked on an iceberg m a storm and to find a bear on the snow bank to dispute the sailor's landing which is not driven away till he has bitten off a sailor's arm, is rueful to laughter."' The extremes that meet through compounding coincidence in this passage -"misfortunes" (the beginning) and "laughter" (the end)are among many that occupy Emerson in his writing.
Readers readily encounter such pairs of seeming extremes as Old World and New World, science and poetry, spirit and matter, interior and exterior, nature and culture. Although we might question Emerson's sense of humor (just how laughable is it to have one's arm removed by a bear?), the meeting of extremes raises some important questions. In a sense, extremes and the movement between themand especially the space between what we tend to call nature and what we tend to call cultureconstitute the very stuff of this issue of Thresholds. They are as well, I suggest, one of Emerson's primary concerns; in short, they amount to Emerson's drift. It IS a simple yet complex little word, drift. I used it |ust now to refer to the "general meaning" of Emerson's thought, but drift also means, as aviators and boaters know, a deviation due to side currents. As such, it could also signify the ground Emerson covered unintentionally, the margin into which he veered while pursuing his course. By definition, "the drift" is both a driving and a being driven; that force which carries things along, the course over which things are carried, and the things themselves carried and deposited. It is the movement of a creek, last fall's oak leaves carried by the creek's current, and the general meaning of flowing water. In a poem that he began beneath the same snowfall during which he recorded the meeting of extremes, Emerson studies another form of drifts.
The poem, titled "The Snow-Storm," was first published in 1841. It opens with the poet describing the effects of the storm on humans:
Announced by all the trumpets of the sky.
Arrives the snow, and, driving o'er the fields.
Seems nowhere to alight: the whited air
Hides hills and woods, the river, and the heaven.
And veils the farm-house at the garden's end.
The sled and traveller stopped, the courier's feet Delayed, all friends shut out, the housemates sit Around the radiant fireplace, enclosed In a tumultuous privacy of storm.
Having ensconced the housemates around the hearth and cut them off from the fury of the driving snow, the poet next takes the reader on a tour of the land m the aftermath of the storm. The powerful conclusion provides the reader with an image of intricacy on which to meditate. By picturing snow as "frolic architecture," Emerson positions nature as an ar-1 concept that the "astonished Art" results from "the north wind's masonry," "the mad wind's night-work," depicting nature's artistic process, at least m this instance, as a flurry of activity, power, movement, drive. Yet the art produced by nature's force is informed more by mischievous humor ("mocking," "mimic") and frolicking whimsy than by deliberate intent, which is to say that the process drifts. Both driving and being driven, the frolic architect works between these extremes.
One extension of the drift of "The Snow-Storm" involves our ability to understand what we call "nature." "Frolic architecture" connotes a playful structure, one that would make its inhabitants and on-lookers merry (and here I am reminded of a colleague, a professor of the literature of American Modernism, who once dismissed Peter Eisenman's Wexner Center as "a funhouse"). Frolic comes from the Dutch word vroolijk ("joyously").^The poet has been made joyous by the wind's random design, and in this joyousness a recent biographer finds one of Emerson's "central insights." According to Robert Richardson, the key idea that emerged from the blizzard of 1834 and the poems (especially "The Snow-Storm") built upon that idea entails a recognition of the integral relationship between world and mind.^"Frolic architecture." as I read it. highlights the connection between human understanding and the world's moment-by-moment unfolding. To counter the conceptual drift of humans away from nature, Emerson, in other writings, calls attention to special forms of patience and interpretation. Patience and interpretation are related to what I've elsewhere called participance, a word denoting a heightened form of participation in worldly unfolding that involves facing up to the challenges and complexity of life, connecting the sundry contexts that comprise that complexity, and truly taking part in nature. Only by taking part in nature can we begin to understand nature and ourselves. That is. to understand nature's drift we have to understand ourselves as belonging to it.-Another extension regards "cultural" activities such as writing, painting, architecture, philosophy, etc. In addition to joy and merrymaking, frolic connotes a sort of lively, sportive movement (including "gamboling" and "capering about" in the OED, "leaping" in H^ebsfer's New World Dictionary). If, according to the principle of participance, a primary role of the poet or teacher or architect is to serve as a witness for the world's unfolding from withiin it, to highlight human involvement in nature, then cultural activities must be seen as occurring under the drift of nature. He or she who plies the time-honored craft of "furthering culture," to perform her or his work responsibly, must take seriously that deep relation.
Doing so will involve something like frolicking moving in a particular sort of way over a particular sort of ground, moving between driving and being driven.
In-Betweenness, Too-Muchness
In his engaging history of the subject. Bernard Mergen writes that "The various attempts to name and define snow illuminate the ways nature and culture interact."'' Mergen's formulation would seem to suggest that nature and culture occupy separate states that sometimes come into contact, and then further that snow can help us understand the place where they meet. Building off of Emerson's frolicsome metaphor, however, we can be led by snow to rethink the conceptual division of nature and culture, a rethinking with which Emerson struggled in other works.' To take up that struggle is to explore the meaning of "the In-Between," the zone in which driving and being driven, chaos and order, nature and culture do and do not mix. Such exploration is by nature interpretive, the roots of which are entangled in meaning or value {-prat, price) and the space-between (inter-). Interpretation as moving-be-tween becomes more important as we reveal and deal with the many gaps that shape our experience of the world and that often undermine our communication within it.
There are gaps between unitsbetween cultures, between disciplines, between governments and the governed; there are gaps within unitsfamilial (e.g. between generations), social (between genders, classes, "races"), ecological (between genera: the bird-nut who loads seed into the bird-feeder/the nuthatch feeding).
There are temporal gaps (between "now," as I write this, and now, as you read it), communication gaps (between what teachers teach and what students learn), and gaps between theory and practice (Entre dicho y hecho hay gran trecho). "Gap" can signify a breach, hiatus, cleavage, difference, a lag, opening, coming apart, a space-between, an abyss, an interval, interruptionthus there is a gap between a gap that ever remains a gap and a gap that may be traversed. It is necessary to acknowledge gaps and their types in order to respect or question, build upon or dismantle them. While Emerson's "frolic architecture" alludes to the In-Between. in wasn't until a decade after the "The Snow-Storm" that he considered the matter at length. In Emerson's English Traits (1856), one finds a disturbing (but not uncommon) separation of nature and culture, as well as a fertile troubling of that separation. The gap becomes acutely provocative in a scene from "Stonehenge," the sixteenth of nineteen chapters. Emerson recalls touring the countryside with Thomas Carlyle, clambering about the monoliths, cigar smoke, cedars, and the following moment of disconnection:
On the way to Winchester, whither our host accompanied us in the afternoon, my friends asked many questions respecting American landscape, forests, houses, -my house, for example. It is not easy to answer these queries well. There, I thought, in America, lies nature sleeping, overgrowing, almost conscious, too much by half for man in the picture, and so giving a certain tristesse, like the rank vegetation of swamps and forests seen at night, steeped in dews and rains, which it loves; and on it man seems not able to make much impression. There, in that great sloven continent, in high Alleghany pastures, in the sea-wide sky-skirted prairie, still sleeps and murmurs and hides the great mother, long since driven away from the trim hedge-rows and over-cultivated garden of England. And, in England, I am quite too sensible of this. Every one is on his good behavior and must be dressed for dinner at six. So I put off my friends with very inadequate details, as best I could."* In this rich passage, Emerson posits a gap wider than the Atlantic between England and America, an expanse that overwhelms the speaker and debilitates the possibility of answering his friends' questions about where he resides.
More importantly, the American scholar in England describes an unfortunately commonplace gap in our thinking of nature's nature. For the Emerson of this passage, nature only exists in overgrowth and swamps and forests and prairies, not in hedge-rows or gardens or hedge-trimmers or gardeners. America consists of a nature on which humans make no mark, whereas England's cultivated markings have blotted out any signs of the natural. Put simply, in England nature has been overrun by culture. Humans occupy an order of being that is unnatural or extranatural, an order capable of chasing away nature from a specific place. In America, on the other hand, nature persists with a certain "too-muchness"; humans, again of an extranatural order, are incapable of "making an impression" on naturea phrase that connotes various forms of culture. Culture, this excerpt from English Traits implies, pertains to the ability to make an impression on nature, whether it be agriculture or "high" culture.
Emerson's experience of the gap between England and America is founded upon another gapa divisive view of the world that posits a significant space between humans and our geobiotic home. In failing to describe his home turf, Emerson symptomatizes a widespread condition: alienation from nature. While the condition usually entails a physical removal and resultant separation anxiety (not unlike 18th-century accounts of scurvy), m Emerson's case it IS complicated and exacerbated by a metaphysical disjunction. We are estranged from nature, not because we have "driven away" the "great mother" and no longer lie cozily in her arms, but because of our doggedness in intellectually and spiritually separating ourselves from our biotic facts of life, because of our refusal to reckon the interconnectedness of living things, the ecology even of human thinking, the often beastly unpleasant yet as often unbearably beautiful nature of human culture. Alienated by nature (which is "too much by half for man in the picture") and from nature (having traveled from the "great sloven continent" to the "garden"), Emerson finds himself at a loss for words.
In sum, Emerson's problem in this passage comes from being unable to translate America into English terms, a condition caused by the inability to traverse the gap between nature and culture. Emerson, that is to say, is caught in a bind. On the one hand, he is a well-schooled, nicely cultured, articulate English descendant whose own rank and overgrowing home does not lend itself to cultivation and thus gives him "a certain tristesse." On the other hand, he is a proud product of "that great sloven conti-2 Photographs of snow crystals nent" who now finds himself in a country where everyone must be well-behaved, impeccably mannered, punctual, and formally dressed for dinner. In America, the cultivated Emerson is a trifle trepid regarding a landscape on which humans cannot make an impression; here nature's excess is too much for culture. In England, he is "quite too sensible" of the over-cultivated lay of the land, which lacks the grandeur, opportunity, immensity, messmess, and purity of the "sea-wide sky-skirted prairie": there, culture appears to be too much for nature. English Traits describes Emerson's efforts to fathom the gap, his attempt to articulate nature's Too-Muchness with adequate details. Such, however, being less his intention than it is his drift, the book itself presents a lesson in nature's excessive primacy and capricious construction.
England, according to Emerson's account, has failed to learn that lesson, and the writer expresses his fears that America will too. change, crotchety positivism), and factitiousness. Dualism separates humans from nature, thereby delimiting nature; fixity further delimits nature by concretizing duality and imposing an unchanging order on the world's observable flux. As such, these traits would appear to be anti-nature or unnatural.
But these traits, Emerson suggests, may have arisen naturally. He points out that it is English nature to take culture kindly, but suggests that English culture does not return the favor by taking nature kindly. Instead, nature is posited by the English as something separate, something other, to be surmounted. English culture, by nature, is based on and strives to maintain factitiousness a condition in which artifice, propriety, and convention hold dominion over nature, spontaneity, and change.
Emerson portrays England by turns as a "museum," a "garden," "strongbox," etc., treating the island as a nursery specializing in factitious growth. If in England art is seen to vanquish nature, and "the views of nature held by any people determine all of their institutions," it follows that English institutions are built upon artificial principles, thereby giving rise to "an artificial completeness in this nation of artificers."' The term "factitious" itself occupies a special status in the book, occurring in chapters on "Land" and on "Literature" and even serving as a page-header in a chapter on " Ability Distinguishing between what is made by nature and what is made by human artifice, the American condemns the British for putting their chips with the artificial.
In the absence of the highest aims, of the pure love of knowledge and the surrender to nature, there is the suppression of the imagination, the priapism of the senses and the understanding; we have the factitious instead of the natural; tasteless expense, arts of comfort, and the rewarding as an illustrious inventor whosoever will contrive one impediment more to interpose between the man and his objects.'"
Factitiousness, Onwardness
Throughout his travelogue and cultural critique. Emerson attends to three key characteristics of British worldmaking: duality (division of the world into fundamental antagonisms), fixity (intellectual insularity, resistance to A small paragraph by Emersonian standards, its three clauses represent m fine Emerson's findings on the issue at hand (the English literary scene) and on the larger issue to which it belongs (English traits in general). It is a terse diagnosis of British disease, pivoting on the laconic second clause: "we have the factitious instead of the natural." This, really, is the heart of the matter, the primary pathology, of which the surrounding traits are symptoms. The consumption of luxuries, of goods and services to satisfy artificial desires, results from an economic system itself the product of false principles. These goods and services supply unnatural comfort that inevitably fails to provide for underlying needs (human "necessaries," in Thoreau's terms), and instead exacerbate the condition. By valuing "arts of comfort," the British economic system puts impediments between subjects and objects, thereby aggravating the perceived disconnection between humans and the world.
Nature having been denied, artifice becomes the norm. Cut off from nature and thus the nature of things, the British indulge themselves in "tasteless expense" on artificial things, a cure that makes them worse. The lack of a connection with naturea perceptual "nature-lessness"cannot be satisfied by the consumption of artifice.
Unable to get satisfaction, the British become "Priapists,"
prostitutes to "what is low or base," as the OED states, using the phrase from Emerson's paragraph as example: but it also connotes (m Webster's American Dictionary of the period) "More or less permanent erection and rigidity of the penis, without concupiscence": unfulfillable drives, unnatural manliness, day-in-and-day-out carnality, a constant itch never sufficiently scratched.
Linking priapism to the senses and the understanding, Emerson's critical diagnosis explains British factitiousness as perpetually materialistic, rigidly uncreative, insatiably empirical. It IS worth noting again the first clause of the passage, which implies the writer's propositions for improved prospects: "highest aims, ...the pure love of knowledge and the surrender to nature, [and] . ..imagination." Unfortunately absent from English traits, the items listed fuse philosophy, nature, and creativity, implying that the answer to our conditions (on either side of the Atlantic) lies precisely in their integration.
Human intellectual endeavor, especially that which pertains to the imaginative and the philosophical, often serves as the marker of our separation from nature, but Emerson aligns that endeavor with "surrender to nature" in the paragraph, against sensorial priapism, experiential impediments, superfluous comforts, and the factitious. Surrender to nature becomes something of a key to overcoming factitiousness. This does not appear to mean a surrender to carnality, to the senses and the understanding, though these must have some share in the natural.
Priapismthe unnaturally exaggerated excitation of these facultiesleads us astray because it IS coupled neither with higher aims nor with a surrender to nature.
Emerson advocates rethinking what is and is not natural, a rethinking driven by nature and imagination. Philosophical and imaginative thinking not grounded in nature fails to go forward: doing what comes naturally, when 3 Photographs of snow crystals not considered in conjunction with imaginative renderings of nature, stagnates in an artificial swamp. "Surrender to nature" can indicate either yielding to an opposing force (as in surrendering culture to nature) or giving way to something already at work within and about one. This latter entails understanding ourselves as caught up in nature's drift: reckoning that which is always-already at work in and on us, becoming aware of its existence and acknowledging its various manifestations, relations, and meanings, and allowing nature to do what it does, accepting and working with the consequences. The first version of surrender reflects the British version of nature-as-other; the second stems from the paradox with which Emerson operates throughout English Traits: the British treat nature as other due to their nature. It is natural for the English to be factitious. The paradox may explain why Emerson in "Stonehenge" "put off my friends with very inadequate details, as best I could."
In that passage, the writer doubts his ability to communicate the American condition, not because he's simply on the side of nature in the nature v. culture war, but rather because he suspects himself to function in the gap between nature and culture, always natural, even when cultural, and even when his cultural heritage claims extra-natural status.
How else but inadequately could one explain the gap and the relations it governs to those firmly bred in factitiousness? To do so adequately is to keep alive the movement between the natural and the culturalwhich movement IS after all (and above all) natural. Advocating the natural against the culturalas something separate and superior maintains an oceanic separation between the two, in the grandest tradition of dualism, fixity, and factitiousness.
Only by surrendering to nature's toomuchnessadmitting the complexity and flux and fugacity of each moment and our reckoning of itcan we move onward from the limited and limiting concepts of "nature" and "culture" that pervade the nature of our culture as it has evolved.
Yet it IS also in our nature to resist rather than capitulate. If we do not reckon that fact of nature, we fall into the same old gaps. I take this to be the crux of Emerson's difficulties on the road to Winchester. The lesson of the "Stonehenge" chapter is that the chapter itself, like the architectural structure from which it takes its name, is a natural expression. Nature, always too much by half for humans in the picture, leaves no room for cultural activity (making an impression) to occur outside of nature. By remarking and resisting the cultural tendency to privilege itself in a hierarchical binary with nature and insisting instead that nature is too much for the binary to hold, Emerson suggests that nature constructs the gap between our concept of nature and our concept of culture. In the concluding paragraph of the book, the writer surmises that the best prospects for propagating the most congenial of English traits (e.g., courage, strength, thoughtfulness, generosity) lie in human "elasticity and hope"that is to say, in moving beyond the least congenial of English traits (fixity, insularity, duality, etc.). Hope flourishes in our flexible and self-reflexive participation in the flux of things, in our surrender to nature's perpetual excess and procession, in our "wising up" to the story of evolution." There is a gap between what we think nature is and what nature is. But "what we think nature is" is entirely natural also, a product of nature, an instance of nature thinking. To speak of a gap between nature and culture is not to speak of a "rift."
The gap is the drift on which we must build. 4 Snow on lawn installation, January 2003
